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My reading of Ádám Bodor’s novel Sinistra körzet (Sinistra District, 1992) shows
that the political dimension of literary production cannot be reduced to the problem
of referentiality (the correct representation of an empirical reality in a realist or an
allegorical narrative). In fact, Bodor’s fiction suggests that it is precisely the break-
down of the referential paradigm that is the privileged political moment in literature.
As I argue, Bodor’s text suggests that beyond the political realism of historical
referentiality we find a new kind of geopolitics based on a regionalist aesthetics of
“mood.” In this regard, it becomes clear that the “Sinistra District” is not an allegori-
cal representation of a historical reality (the world of totalitarian regimes) but a rhe-
torical figure which stages the ideological fantasy that structures that given histori-
cal realty.
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Although by the time Ádám Bodor moved to Hungary from Transylvania in
1982 he was a fairly well-published author in Romania (his first volume came out
in 1969) who had received appreciative criticism from important figures of the
Romanian–Hungarian cultural elite, his Hungarian reception was rather sporadic
and meager. Györgyi Pozsvai explains this critical attitude by pointing out that
Bodor refused to be a “minority author” at a time when the official state-run cul-
tural machinery expected an explicit engagement with the work on “collective
consciousness” from Hungarian artists living in neighboring countries (200).
With the Hungarian publication of two of his volumes, by the second half of the
1980s his literary reputation was definitely on the rise. This appreciative critical
tendency reached its climax with the publication of the novel Sinistra District in
1992, which was immediately hailed as a “true masterpiece.”1
But one of the most salient features of the contemporary reviews of Bodor’s
novel was a rather antagonistic polarization of the critical responses, a polariza-
tion that could be interpreted as a historical symptom of the reorganization of crit-
ical discourses after the collapse of the socialist system. The debate was mainly
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centered around the novel’s relation to the experiences of the socialist past. One of
the camps seemed to take it for granted that the novel was primarily about the po-
litical and ethical structures of a given socio-political system,2 while the other
camp tried hard to do away with the geopolitical reading by emphasizing the for-
mal (or in their own term, hermeneutic) complications of the work.3 To put it dif-
ferently, the basic matrix for one set of the readings was geopolitical territory,
while for the other it was (narratological) poetic space.
In the more recent criticism on the novel this polarization is explicitly ad-
dressed as a critical heritage, but instead of asking for its conditions and limits
newer readings often seem content simply to describe the two poles and declare
affiliation with one of the extremes. For example, in her monograph on Bodor,
Györgyi Pozsvai discusses the reception of Sinistra in the following way:
Although the majority of the readings is based on narratological anal-
ysis or devotes a considerable amount of attention to the structural
features of the work, this criticism still displays a duplicity based on
whether the given readings stay within the limits of an aesthetic uni-
verse or, by moving beyond it, engage in external adequations (for
example, historical or political) (204).
Pozsvai makes her own stance obvious on a number of occasions, for example,
when she insists that Sinistra “was not written as a response to an actual political
situation or as a work with didactic content” (163). Commenting on the ethical
complications of the novel, Béla Kovács, as a part of his summary of the polarized
reception, writes
To the same extent that the above-mentioned [geopolitical] readings
take it as self-evident that the ethical aspects of the novel are tied to
the political history of a region, those who pay more attention to the
poetic complications of the work are uncertain about the validity of
such claims. As a consequence, the question as to whether the
Sinistra District is essentially amoral or not can still be seen as a le-
gitimate question for readings of the novel, but it appears to be almost
definite that the area around Dobrin City is not such an easily defined
geographical region as the above-mentioned readings would have it
(131).
In this regard, László Bengi’s reading of the novel is important in that it builds
its own construction upon the insights of the narratological readings, yet it also
points out the limitations of this kind of criticism by reference to a philosophy of
subjectivity. This is how Bengi describes the two critical poles: one group of criti-
cism, by paying rather little attention to the actual form of the text,
takes for its point of departure the anthropological determinations (or
worse, the political adequations) mediated by Sinistra District and in-
terprets the text as a reflection on being or existence (95).
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The readings that belong to the other pole, however, start from narratological
considerations, “but they either cannot or are not willing to apply their findings to
the field of the reflection on being” (96). Consequently, while still acknowledging
his ties with the hermeneutical camp, he formulates his own project as an attempt
“to move from a narrato-poetical analysis of textual organization, from the inter-
pretation of poetic construction, to the question of subjectivity” (97).
Let us, then, take Bengi’s argument as our starting point in formulating our dis-
agreement with both of these critical camps. Since the critical heritage frames a set
of problems in a strictly exclusive manner, the question emerges whether it could
be possible to bring back into the discussion the problem of the “geopolitical” in
such a way that (to use Bengi’s expression) “the reflection on being” becomes a
political problem. Simply put, it is not the mere fact but the manner of the earlier
geopolitical readings that we should find objectionable, since they reduce the po-
litical dimension of the aesthetic to a realistic content or an empirical referent. My
problem with the narratological readings in the present context is that, although
this should not be a necessary consequence of their premises, in their discourse
“politics” becomes an absolutely untheorized blind spot, and as such it is simply
dismissed even before it could become an object of critical reflection. Staging the
debate in these terms presents us with a false alternative. On the basis of the texts
of these critics, it seems as if we have only two choices: we can either choose to
read the political in a rather simplistic way or we have simply to dismiss political
readings in general. As I would like to believe, however, our task is not to dismiss,
but to think through the complications of geopolitics in Bodor’s text.
The Mood of a Not Too Distinctly Defined Region
If we choose to speak in geopolitical categories, first we must settle the mean-
ing of the term “Eastern Europe.” In order to set up this discussion, I will start with
a reading of A Börtön szaga (The Smell of Prison), an extended book-length inter-
view with Bodor edited by Zsófia Balla. On the basis of this interview, it becomes
excessively obvious that Bodor is intensively preoccupied with the question of
Eastern European identity, yet he shows himself somewhat hesitant to give this
identity a primarily political meaning in the restricted sense. First, we must point
out that he considers it to be a much broader historical category that goes far be-
yond the effects of Communist dictatorships. In light of this insistence on the cen-
trality of the geopolitical theme in his fiction, it seems somewhat absurd that the
complete evacuation of this theme could ever become a serious program for liter-
ary criticism. It is equally obvious, however, that according to Bodor’s definition
of the function of art, the geopolitical moment cannot be reduced to a realistic con-
tent that simply refers to and mirrors an extra-textual political reality. Hence, the
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critical question has to be formulated in the following terms: inasmuch as litera-
ture cannot be reduced to an exclusively political meaning, how do we talk about
the equally irreducible political component? My point is that the political moment
is precisely the failure of this mimetic component and not the realistic recognition
of a historical reality. In other words, it is precisely the failure of the mimetic rep-
resentation of an Eastern European reality that is the irreducible geopolitical
moment in Bodor’s art rather than its successful recreation in an allegorical
narrative.
I will quote here at length the passage that most concisely summarizes Bodor’s
ars poetica:
I am primarily inspired by the existential landscape of the homeland
and the whole Eastern European region, by its primitive morals, le-
thargic mood; I could hardly have written about anything else or in
any other way. Consequently, right from the very beginning, my
writings seemed to be the products of the publication industry of a
democratic society – always staying clear of the terminology of any
power structure. There is not one word in them about the social con-
ditions that surrounded me in reality, only about the mood [életérzés]
of a not too distinctly defined region – which indirectly might of
course project the ominous image of a fictive political system. Nev-
ertheless, not so concretely and not to the degree that the actually ex-
isting system could have taken offense at it. This was so much the
easier for me since I was really not preoccupied with the anatomy of
communist despotism, the litany of its incidental crimes, or the cri-
tique of its ideology. As I have already mentioned, my main interest
was the general moral and existential landscape of the region which,
as it already appeared to be at the time, is mostly independent from
the ideologies of the political systems that happen to be in power. We
are talking about a finely tuned system of communication, the keys to
which point towards aesthetics and ethics and not politics. To this
very day I am still embarrassed by taking concrete political stances,
when a piece of writing has a primarily political and not an ethical
and aesthetic message. And while the writer is still trying to talk
about the most important things, the general feeling of threat and
helplessness, in the course of the ceaseless search for modes of ex-
pression the language of writing gets refined: through its obligatorily
elliptical structure, writing gained in artistic surplus. At the same
time, coaxed into the labyrinths of the aesthetic, the attention of the
censor also tended to fail him – it became possible to circumvent him.
Although my short stories were undeniably the products of and about
a strictly controlled world, in their fictitious, timeless space, resigned
atmosphere, sometimes grotesque internal relations, the political
system was ashamed to recognize itself. The most important thing
was that the censors did not know what to do with them (152–154).
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Three significant tensions come to the fore in these lines: first, there is an oppo-
sition between politics and ethics/aesthetics; second, we find an assertion of a cer-
tain regionalist aesthetic based on the contrast between historical reality and
mood; and third, there is a tension between the renunciation of the political con-
tent of literature and a simultaneous affirmation of political critique through art
(after all, the system is ashamed to recognize itself in these works). The first two
of these oppositions can be easily aligned to form a coherent system. On the one
side, we find the aesthetic and ethical function of art connected to a regionalist re-
alism of “mood.” At the same time, Bodor rejects political content reduced to a re-
alism of facts. This is why the third opposition seems to disturb the equilibrium of
the argument, since it raises the possibility of a political function that goes beyond
historical realism.
As we can see, Eastern Europe is defined in the passage cited as the primary ob-
ject of representation, only the reflected reality is not an empirical reality of the
author’s life experiences but rather a much more elusive entity referred to as “the
mood of a not too distinctly defined region.” Right away it should be obvious that
this expression, in an almost contradictory manner, posits the unity of mood of an
indefinite entity. As if the unity of a region, elusive in concrete physical determi-
nations, could be allocated to the actual unity of an immaterial instance like a
mood. Bengi has already implicitly indicated the significance of this shift in
Heideggerian terms when he wrote of Sinistra District:
Therefore, I do not claim that the world of the district is or could be
independent in all respects from the experience of dictatorships. I
only insist that for the poetic interpretation this experience is not al-
ready given and does not fulfill its actual role in an extra-aesthetic di-
mension. It is rather, as a (world-interpreting) component of the
form-giving function, created in the process of reading, as a univer-
sal moment of man’s attunement in being (98, my emphasis).
One is thus tempted to speak of Bodor’s art in a Heideggerian language, in uni-
versal existential terms that refer us to “the (uniform) state of thrownness in
facticity” (111). As we have seen, however, Bodor himself does not speak in uni-
versal but in regional terms. Furthermore, Bodor discusses Eastern Europe as a
source of identity that secures a historical continuity more fundamental than the
accidental political formations that happen to superimpose themselves on this
quasi-ontological region:
As I have already mentioned, my main interest was the general moral
and existential landscape of the region, which […] is mostly inde-
pendent from the ideologies of the political systems that happen to be
in power.
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Therefore, the issue is not just the opposition between the experience of dicta-
torship and the universal human condition, but the problem of a regional identity
that incidentally includes both, yet cannot be reduced to either, and primarily has
the mode of existence of a “mood.” This is why I agree with Bengi’s point that the
“political experience” brought into the aesthetic field cannot preexist the act of
reading but must be produced by it. We have to add, though, that the universal ex-
istential condition does not preexist the aesthetic experience either. To put it dif-
ferently, art cannot be a simple metaphor for an abstraction called the human con-
dition, since the latter does not exist until the act of reading creates it. Hence the
significance of the regional for Bodor: the universal will always only appear as it
is produced within the experience of the regional.
In the quoted passage, after dismissing the political, Bodor defines the function
of art itself as that which goes beyond the world of transient political formations to
the more fundamental level of ethics and aesthetics. We also learn, however, that
under the rule of the given political system the political dimension of the text is
only manifested through absences, or through the very absence of the political as
such: the censorial intervention necessitates a politics/poetics of omissions and el-
lipses. That is, while Bodor rejects realistic political content, he maintains a po-
tential political function for his fiction. And as the passage makes clear, this poetic
and political strategy is based on a double movement: a missing element produces
an artistic surplus (“through its obligatorily elliptical structure, writing gained in
artistic surplus”).
Bodor discusses the significance of this double movement of ellipsis and artis-
tic surplus in quite precise terms. First of all, let us consider the missing element
that generates the artistic surplus. It is important here that we distinguish two dif-
ferent forms of ellipsis: the prohibited and the impossible. In the passage quoted
above the missing element is primarily defined as the empirical reality that is not
represented for both artistic and political reasons. This incidental censorial omis-
sion, however, is based on a more fundamental understanding of the missing ele-
ment as a traumatic kernel of personal experience. Commenting on his childhood
and the lack of his childhood experience in his works, Bodor says the following:
Thus, this abstinence from actual experience is equally a question of
principle and instinct: I have no other choice but to obey myself. […]
Therefore, my childhood is also missing from my writings. Or maybe
this is how it actually really appears in it. […] But if I touched its
shell, if I tried to extricate the real events from below their skin, I
would deprive the memory of its mystery, its living force, its virgin-
ity, all in all, of its artistic stimulus. This is why I do not write prison
novels either (183).
The logic of this omission is not the same as that of the political intervention of
the censor. In the present case, “personal experience” is missing from the texts
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precisely because of its very significance: its most authentic artistic “representa-
tion” turns out to be its designation as the locus of the lack that produces artistic
surplus. On the one hand, then, we find the strategic movement to circumvent the
censor; on the other hand, we have the impossible confrontation with the trau-
matic kernel of “personal experience” which simply cannot be represented – it en-
ters the field of representation as that which is absent.
In order to understand the function of the artistic surplus produced by this lack
let me recount one of Bodor’s rather amusing anecdotes. Apparently sometime in
the early seventies a whole socialist brigade of basket weavers took offense at one
of his short stories (entitled “A Place Where They Weave Baskets”) and dis-
patched its delegates to the editor of the journal that published the story to set the
facts right. Here is Bodor’s summary of this little farce of collective misreading:
The writer comrade was right about a number of things, especially
what concerns the comrade who did some jail time, but certain details
need to be corrected. Anyway, how does he know all this when none
of us seems to remember that he had ever visited the workshop in per-
son? As it turned out, the imaginary milieu, the region within the
short story, had an almost identical replica in our proximity, only in a
more commonplace, more mundane version, without the artistic sur-
plus of deviant elements. The objectionable part was this excess with
which the honorable basket weavers did not know what to do; they
wanted to take out of the story precisely that which was the reason
why it was written in the first place. […] It seems as if when some-
thing is well-made-up, it is a part of reality (185).
Whether the story is real or not, it can be read as a parable of misreading: it rep-
resents the “realist fallacy” that cannot come to terms with an artistic excess. By
identifying an excess with which they themselves cannot identify, the basket
weavers’ reading can be translated into the following interplay of recognition and
non-recognition: “Yes, that’s me. But this is not how I should be seen.” In other
words, the short story provoked a certain mismatch between imaginary and sym-
bolic identification: to be more precise, it caused an excess of symbolic identifica-
tion (an identification with the position from which you are observed, the
ego-ideal) at the expense of an imaginary identification (an identification with the
ideal ego, the exemplary communist worker).
The censor and the basket weaver are the two main characters of the same sys-
tem of misreadings. The basket weaver identifies with the position of the censor
and wants to intervene in the story; the censor, in order to locate the potentially
harmful elements of the story, has to identify with the point of view of the ordi-
nary worker-reader (e.g., that of a basket weaver) and ends up tolerating but not
censoring the piece because, as Bodor puts it, “the political system was ashamed
to recognize itself” in his stories. The significance of this little comedy of
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misreadings is the symmetrical structure of misrecognitions in Bodor’s stories: in
his own words, the artistic essence of his texts is precisely the fact that they allow
for this double play of identifications and non-recognitions.4 What Bodor is sug-
gesting here is that the reason why his fiction actually “works” is not only that it
makes this double misunderstanding possible (as an amusing, comic episode), but
that this misrecognition is structurally encoded in the very texture of his work: his
fiction is a privileged region of misrecognition. In other words, and Bodor is very
explicit about this point, the point of art is precisely to disrupt identification rather
than fully accommodate it. What we find beyond this imaginary identification is
merely a mood.
What appears to be significant from the perspective of the reception of the
novel is that the field of ethics is also structured by a similar moment of
misrecognition. According to Bodor, both truth and the authentic ethical act nec-
essarily arise from misrecognition. Responding to Zsófia Balla’s question con-
cerning the seemingly unavoidable fate of alcoholism and Transylvanian patterns
of survival and self-destruction, Bodor recounts two similar stories of
misrecognition that go beyond the situational comedy of mistaken identities and
describe Eastern European ethical patterns. The protagonist of the first story is the
author himself. He tells us about a party that he organized at his own house after
he finally received his passport from the Romanian authorities so that he could
move to Hungary. During the celebration he got so drunk that, although he was at
home, at one point of the night he started asking his wife if they had enough
money to take a cab home: “This would be, then, the meaning of perfect diversion
[kikapcsolódás], when even your usual surroundings are completely alienated”
(160). While diversion and alienation are exact opposites (since diversion tempo-
rarily restores identity to itself), “perfect diversion” coincides with its seeming
opposite, “complete alienation.” Although the home is supposedly a refuge from
alienation and it should provide a secure haven for the restoration of identity
threatened by an alienating reality, in Bodor’s anecdote this structure is reversed,
or better, pursued to its paradoxical conclusion. Diversion turns out to be an alien-
ation from alienation; and this alienation to the second degree (“complete alien-
ation”) is pursued as a form of recreation. To be completely at home is to
misrecognize the home. In other words, the truth about the home cannot exclu-
sively come from knowledge of the home – it has to emerge from a
misrecognition. We find the only authentic relation to the home in this uncanny
homelessness, when home is revealed as a fantasy.
The second anecdote relates the strange case of László Csiki, Bodor’s friend,
who ended up cheating with his own wife:
In a state similar to mine, he started wooing his own wife ferociously.
In the frenzy of the revelry, he took a liking to her, and without hesi-
tation started pursuing her. After reaching the conclusion that things
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had taken their intended course and he had managed to seduce her, he
ventured the indecent proposal that they should disappear from the
party together, only they can’t go to his place because his wife is at
home. The wife had the quick solution: no problem, they can go to
her place, because her husband is out somewhere drinking again.
They departed together happily. Such is the tragic case of the ideal
husband who can only be unfaithful with his own wife. These are
doubtlessly deplorable moments, but without similar vices our lives
would be infinitely drearier and poorer. We would know less about
ourselves, each other, and the place where these things happen
(160–161).
While the first anecdote describes complete alienation from the “home” as the
source of truth about the home, the second story gives a somewhat tragic and pa-
thetic ethical meaning to the formula “cheating with your own wife.” What is
common to both, however, is that these moments of misrecognition are necessary
for the emergence of an ethical relation to the home. The only way to know your
“home” and the people who inhabit it with you is to place yourself in a state of
complete homelessness. The misrecognition of your “own” (home/wife) receives
a positive value, since it is misrecognition that produces real knowledge and not
recognition which, in the final instance, is reduced to a mere illusion (“csalóka
káprázat” [160]).
The ethical content of the husband’s misguided decision is based on the con-
scious choice of immoral behavior that reveals the inadequacy of “moral doc-
trine” (the command not to cheat) to be either the guarantee of an ethical act or to
provide authentic knowledge. While it might be morally acceptable, there is noth-
ing inherently ethical about the fact that a husband and a wife sleep together. The
only way to give this act an ethical content is to inscribe misrecognition in the mo-
ment of decision that will allow the subject to step outside the law and reinstitute it
once again, as if for the first time. The message of the husband’s act is that “I
choose you once again beyond the law.” In other words, I am not choosing you be-
cause the moral law demands that I only sleep with you; rather, I reinstitute the
law because I choose (actively and not passively in obeisance to the law) you
again – this is a real new choice and the object of the choice happens to be you
again. This ethical formula, however, should be distinguished from the classic
formula of doing evil from which good may come. In the latter case, in order to
serve the ultimate good, I will do evil things, so that in the end the good will be re-
alized (as if the Hegelian ruse of reason were at work here). This position implies
that I know what the good is, and my actions are guided by this good, even if I
have to do bad things to achieve it. In the end, the final achievement of the good
will cancel out the evil of my previous acts. But in Bodor’s anecdote, although the
husband knows what the good is, he simply chooses not to be good without the
knowledge that this choice might lead to a good that will retroactively exonerate
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him. The fact that his action leads to the good that he renounced in the first place
and that this realization takes on the character of a (re)institution of the law, shows
that “the good” cannot pre-exist the ethical act, it must be produced by it.
Let me recapitulate the argument up to this point. First of all, Eastern Europe is
identified by Bodor as the primary “object” of representation. This Eastern Eu-
rope, however, is not a factual reality but a mood. Since this mood cannot be re-
duced to the objective reality we recognize as Eastern Europe, it will have to be
marked by a surplus element in this reality. Therefore, Eastern Europe as mood
enters the field of literature as an “artistic surplus” produced by its absence in that
field. Due to its excessive nature, it is located beyond identification both for the
subject and power. Therefore, the function of art is to interrupt identification in or-
der to make the experience of this artistic surplus possible. The move beyond
identification takes the form of a misrecognition. On the level of politics, the sub-
ject misrecognizes its position with relation to power; on the level of ethics, the
subject misrecognizes the good it chooses to serve by identifying this good with
the law as moral doctrine. But if the subject necessarily misrecognizes its position
in ideological interpellation, the move beyond identification is only possible by
way of a misrecognition to the second degree (rather than a final recognition of re-
ality as it really is). In other words, the secondary misrecognition does not restore
the original identity of recognition beyond ideological distortion; rather, it makes
possible the creation of a different relation to the unrepresentable kernel of
experience.
Reading for the Mood
Thus, the task of reading appointed by Bodor is threefold: first, we have to read
for a rhetorical surplus produced by elliptical movements; second, these rhetorical
strategies should initiate a politics beyond identification; and third, this politics
should be inscribed in the geopolitical determination of mood named by the term
“Eastern Europe.” Let us first examine how these three motives come together in
the central metaphor of Sinistra District: the district itself. The most apparent
achievement of the text is the staging of a fantasy of Eastern Europe: namely, that
Eastern Europe exists, and it does so with a particular mood, since it is a sinister
district. The novel illustrates how spatialization and territorialization of an iden-
tity (which is always a failed identity) come about. The staging of the territorial
fantasy, however, is not based on a metaphoric substitution according to which
the district stands in for something (Eastern Europe) that could be located outside
the text as its direct reference. Rather, as the excess produced by a lack, the figure
of the district is catachrestic in nature: a territorial metaphor of impossible Eastern
European identity.
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The novel is composed of fifteen chapters, all of which bear a title with a geni-
tive construction that names an excessive element that organizes the figurative
field produced by the elliptical movements of the text (for example, “Andrej’s
Dogtag,” “Bebe Tescovina’s Blood,” “Petrika Hamza’s Love,” “Connie Illafeld’s
Hair,” and so on). This object or other possession does not appear to have a central
role for the plot sequence revealed in the given chapter. Rather, it puts into focus a
partial element that itself reduces the plot to a subordinate position with regard to
this object. Since it is always something that belongs to a character, we could
think of these metonymic objects as figures of impossible identity. For example,
the title of the opening chapter, “Colonel Borcan’s Umbrella,” names the object
that, as a supplementary prosthesis, ensures the identity of the character, since we
learn about Borcan that he is the only one who always carries an umbrella with
him. On the other hand, as the first line of the novel already announces (“Two
weeks before Colonel Borcan died […]” [5]), the umbrella will also be the figure
for his death. As a matter of fact, it is the first independent appearance of the flying
umbrella that announces the Colonel’s death to the community. After his death,
however, the umbrella takes on a life of its own and keeps reappearing in the text,
through an additional figurative displacement, as virtually undistinguishable from
a bat. We can see that the same object ensures the Colonel’s identity and stands in
for the story of his demise. In a similar fashion, for example, the title “Béla
Bundasian’s Fire” could be understood as a reference to Béla’s all-consuming, ex-
cessive love for Connie Illafeld that defines his identity,5 as well as the more im-
mediate allusion to his suicide narrated in the chapter in which he sets himself on
fire after he murders Connie Illafeld and learns of the literal loss of his identity
when his official files are destroyed.
The movement of lack and excess, however, pervades every layer of the novel.
As commentators were quick to note, the subtitle of the text, “Chapters of a
Novel,” already raises important questions about the genre and the unity of the
text. First of all, the subtitle declares the totality of the novel to be absent. It effec-
tively claims that the novel is not here, only its chapters (even if all of the chapters
of the novel are here!). Therefore, this absence, as Bengi points out, leads to repe-
titious attempts in the individual chapters to recreate this missing totality (109).
According to this reading, the chapters turn into independent attempts at recreat-
ing totality: the lack of novelistic totality leads to its excessive recreation in fifteen
different attempts. On the level of plot we encounter the exact same structure. Due
to the lack and excess of novelistic totality one does not have to be an overly alert
reader to start counting inconsistencies and “mistakes” in the continuous retelling
of certain fragments. While parts of the story are clearly re-creatable, it is inter-
rupted by these excesses of plot that therefore refer to absences in the story.6
Thus, we have to point out that the unity of diegesis in the novel is based simply
on the unity of tone, since the novel does switch narrators who, however, seem to
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be speaking in the exact same voice. We get an excess of points of view over unity
of voice. It is also significant that the first switch from first-person narration by
Andrej to third-person narration by an unidentified narrator occurs in chapter 7,
which relates the crucial anticlimactic scene of Andrej’s encounter with his
adopted son, Béla Bundasian. It is as if Andrej could not have narrated this en-
counter (or at least not in the first person), which produces an excessive split in the
narratorial positions. Furthermore, later on we read chapters that narrate events
that Andrej could not possibly have witnessed, either because he was not present
or because they occurred after he had left the district. The uniformity of the lan-
guage of the novel that cuts across characters and narrators has often been com-
mented upon. Language as such seems to be reduced to a limited number of often
repeated available formulas. The same happens to the tropological movements of
the text, since certain recurrent motives are capable of sliding between the differ-
ent textual layers and appear in places that seemingly defy the consistency of the
novel.
The ethical and political dimensions of the text surface here. Let me evoke here
a recurrent motif of the text, the search for unidentified “objects” of characters
who simply do not possess these objects. This motif illustrates the kind of ideolog-
ical fantasy at work that makes possible the double misrecognition that defines the
relationship of the censor and the basket-weaver. While power needs to look for
these illicit objects in its subjects to maintain the illusion that it has full control
over everything, the subjects start to look for similar objects either in power or be-
yond the law to explain why they are not yet fully themselves. Furthermore, the
text also suggests that the very same structure is repeated in the act of reading it-
self: while we want something from a text that it does not possess, the act of
reading should surprise us with something else.
The significance of the search for these unidentified objects is underscored by
the fact that the whole first chapter of the novel narrates the failed transaction of
such a mysterious entity. Shortly after his arrival in the district Andrej is con-
fronted by Colonel Borcan with a question that we could paraphrase as: “Do you
have It?” As it turns out later, Borcan and the stranger only known as “the red
rooster” used to communicate by hiding their messages in the belly of a fish. This
time, the red rooster was supposed to leave this fish with Andrej. Since Borcan re-
fuses to believe that Andrej does not have the fish, he starts blackmailing Andrej
by taking away all his papers. Eventually, Andrej does receive the fish, but only
after Borcan’s death, a fact that he fails to communicate to the red rooster when he
takes the fish. Since Borcan died with Andrej’s file in his pockets, Andrej loses his
official identity. In other words, while Andrej supposedly has what Borcan wants,
Borcan supposedly has that which is necessary for Andrej to complete his
mission. Both of these assumptions are wrong.
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The most important scene figuring such an unidentified object can be found in
chapter 5, “Mustafa Mukkerman’s Truck.” This chapter is crucial because by the
end Andrej understands that he was exposed to a “secret” of power: that the object
either does not exist or power does not always find it. Therefore, from now on,
Andrej is considered to be an “insider” and an intimate aid to Coca Mavrodin. The
scene takes place at the crossing on the Ukrainian border where Coca Mavrodin,
Andrej (as a substitute for the official photographer), and two of Mavrodin’s thugs
with Dobermans await the weekly arrival of Mustafa Mukkerman’s truck. Appar-
ently, the authorities received information from “the Polish colleagues” that
Mukkerman is going to have something on him, but they never said exactly what.
Significantly, the story takes places during a snowstorm that suspends the spatial
and temporal conditions of the narration. Space becomes a formless “grayness”
and time stops flowing: “When Mustafa Mukkerman arrived, everything turned
quiet, the wind stopped blowing, and the snowflakes stopped moving in midair.
Only the thick grayness remained” (48). It is the contrast with these conditions
that highlights the excessive nature of the truck:
The silver walls of the truck were decorated with the kind of non-
sense only a homeless truck driver like him could think of who aim-
lessly wanders through all kind of borders: blue palm trees and green
monkeys under the purple sky, and on one of the sides a lonely, sag-
ging female breast (48–49).
When nothing is found in the bodily recesses of the benevolent, but confus-
ingly insolent giant (who in response to the search, calmly states that he doesn’t
mind at all when his balls are being scratched), Mukkerman tells Coca Mavrodin
that he doesn’t have “the thing” with him because he had a dream about this
search. The story, however, moves beyond the absence of the object when, as an
unexpected gesture, Mukkerman gives a present to Andrej and offers to rescue
him from the district anytime he has the money to pay for it. The lack of the object
and the surplus of the present are figured by the detail that one of the gifts is a
so-called “Kinder Egg”: a Western surprise candy that hides a secret little toy in-
side the chocolate shell. While the mysterious object remains a secret in its ab-
sence, the present itself turns out to be a secret.
The most significant object, however, is Béla Bundasian himself. We have to
remember that our protagonist, Andrej Bodor, is on an ethical quest: he wants to
rescue his adopted son. Andrej penetrates the district because he believes that at
the heart of this closed area he is going to find the supreme good, the only thing
worth living for that was taken away from him. In order to achieve this goal, he is
willing to do anything. He dissimulates full complicity with the system, eventu-
ally to the degree of actually committing murder for them. This supreme good is
never explicitly defined, but we can suppose it to be a certain sense of belonging, a
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vague sense of familial ties, or the singularity of the father-son relationship. Dur-
ing the crucial scene, when after five years Andrej finally finds Béla, the son turns
out to be completely uncooperative and simply asks his father why he is there at
all. Andrej responds, “You are the only one I’ve got” (73). Béla raises an empty
bottle to his mouth until the last drop of alcohol is drained. Then, letting his saliva
grow long, he spits in front of himself and says: “Horrible” (74). We already know
this much: at the heart of darkness one finds horror. This horror is the breakdown
of the fantasy that gave form to one’s life. Later on the same day, while Andrej is
still trying to convince his son to escape from the district with him, the irate Béla
protests: “What are you thinking? You are one of them now. Otherwise you could-
n’t be here.” (77) The paradox is clear: had you been ethical, you would not be
here to claim the prize. In other words, the ethical quest failed to produce its own
good. This final confrontation stages the failure of the fantasy that is necessary for
complicity with system.
But Béla himself acts in a way that aims at maintaining the system: he reports
his father to the authorities and later demands his own punishment for the murder
of Connie Illafeld from a system that refuses to acknowledge his existence. The
next morning, after the meeting with his son, when Andrej is getting ready to re-
turn to his usual quarters from the reservation where his son lives, the following
conversation takes place between him and Nikifor Tescovina concerning Béla:
– Just so that you know, he went to the village last night. Although he
is not allowed to and usually he doesn’t.
Andrej was in the process of unhooking the chain of the speeder
from the bumper. He slowly stood up and felt his stomach with his
hands. He opened his mouth and vomited in front of himself on the
seat. In the sparkling thick saliva, the small pieces of mushroom were
shaking under the threads of coagulated blood.
– You upset your stomach.
– Nonsense. As I bent over, it accidentally slipped out of me.
– It is just like your brain (78–79).
The elliptical conversation between Andrej and Nikifor Tescovina makes it
clear that Béla actually turned his father in to the authorities and reported his real
purposes in trying to infiltrate the district. On this level too, the elliptical construc-
tion of the text produces an absence (we are not told directly what happened the
night before) and Andrej’s response is equally elliptical. He speaks his mind by
producing brain-like vomit. The absence of a verbal response creates an excess of
bodily excretion that takes upon itself the role of a displaced, figurative expres-
sion. In this respect, it is important to point out that the novel pays close attention
to bodily excrements. Descriptions of defecation, urination, vomiting, spitting,
bleeding, and bodily odors saturate the text. In fact, the excessive figures by defi-
nition assume the role of excrements in the novel. They take the form of a dis-
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avowed part of the identity that is externalized as excrement, which nevertheless
is given the role of an alienated (figurative) expression. In this sense, the district
itself is such an excrement of Eastern European identity.
The point of this reading is to show that it is not enough to say that the world of
Sinistra is without “moral values,” as quite a few commentators claimed. Andrej’s
problem is not that he inhabits a world without morals and therefore gets caught in
the evil mechanisms of power. As his encounter with Béla makes it clear, the
problem with Andrej is that he presupposes the existence of a transcendental
good, a good beyond the legitimacy of the positive order that he inhabits, and he
believes that any action can be justified in the name of this goal. In other words, he
fails to produce the good through an ethical act. (He is like the drunken husband
who believes he is sleeping with his wife but ends up cheating on her.) In Andrej’s
case, it is precisely “a moral value” that prevents an ethical act.
There is a double fantasy at work here. On the one hand, the district functions
as the mise en scène of the fantasy of Eastern Europe as a fully controlled, self-en-
closed area. A sinister district in which power reduces every human being to mere
animality, destroys family values, and presents itself in an inscrutable bureau-
cratic form. On the other hand, another fantasy is also at work, which claims that
beyond this system, there is a world of (moral) values, a world of human freedom,
just power, and full expression without alienation. The fantasy of subjective de-
liverance is part of the same ideological mystification as it makes the fantasy of
the omnipotence of power bearable. The promise of this “beyond” makes the
whole situation livable and is therefore essential to achieve the complicity of the
subjects of power. We could call the experience of the failure of this double fan-
tasy, the closed territory and its beyond, the real of “Eastern Europe.”
I certainly agree with Bengi’s analysis of the mechanisms of the discourse of
power represented in the novel as a totalizing and mythologizing tendency that
fails due to the central role of non-identical repetition:
From the point of view of the myth, the Sinistra District is a closed
and self-sufficient model of the world, which at the same time is
identical to its interpretation as fully organizable and controllable
(105).
Repetition serves the purposes of power to the degree that it creates the space of
control and reduces identity to ultimate substitutability, yet iteration fails to main-
tain this power because it also constantly displaces the repeated identity. Never-
theless, I disagree with the conclusion that such a reading can at most lead to an
“existential” but not a geopolitical reading.
First of all, I would translate Bengi’s terms into psychoanalytic terms by sub-
stituting fantasy for myth. In other words, when the novel represents power as an
agent of full control that creates a closed world of its own, it effectively stages the
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ideological fantasy that maintains the reality of dictatorship or a geopolitical iden-
tity (rather than this reality itself). In this sense, what the novel represents is simi-
lar to the mutual misrecognitions of the censor and the basket weavers. On the one
hand, the inhabitants of the district (as subjects of power), even when they per-
ceive the internal inconsistencies of the system, actively participate in maintain-
ing the fantasy of its omnipotence. On the other hand, the representatives of the
system are “ashamed” to recognize themselves in the lack of the illicit object
whose elimination is supposed to maintain their power.
Second, the “universal condition” located by Bengi, what I would call the fail-
ure of identity, has no other mode of existence than the failure of the particular. It
would be a mistake to imagine this failure as an abstract condition that exists inde-
pendently from the particular identities that it displaces. Rather than a fully tran-
scendent condition, we can only speak of a quasi-transcendental one that has no
other existence than the inconsistency of the field it institutes. The particular,
however, is not simply “one,” but the local collection of a multiplicity in a situa-
tion without inherent consistency. This is what we could call, after Bodor, a “re-
gion” which is the intermediary category between an abstract universal condition
and the particular political identity instituted by a system. Geopolitics, in the pres-
ent context, is nothing but the institution of the identity of such a region. There-
fore, the existential condition of failed identity has no other mode of existence
than the way it appears through a region in which the natural and the political are
almost inextricably intertwined. The geopolitical marks precisely the point where
the natural and the political both reach a certain limit.
Theoretical Post-Script: Eastern Europe as Mood
Bodor’s fiction allows us to think “Eastern Europe” as the excessive figure of
the constitutive lack of Eastern European identity. In this sense, Eastern Europe
names the repetitious history of the failure of an identity. This repetition has the
effect of a “territorialization” in that it simultaneously spatializes and tempo-
ralizes this impossible identity. The novel shows how a community, intimately
tied to the geography of the region, creates a home for itself among these subhu-
man conditions. The natural world, as Attila Simon points out, assumes the am-
biguous role of a sublime power, which “as the frame of the scenery, simulta-
neously appears for the inhabitants of Sinistra as a figure of security and protec-
tion and as a mysterious, alien force” (73). The brutalizing world of political
power is carved out of this timeless “metaphysical” background that comes to sig-
nify, for Simon, the universal condition of decay as the highest form of power. But
if the universal condition itself cannot preexist the act of reading (since it must be
produced by it in the first place), the geopolitical moment for Bodor is precisely
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the interaction of the natural world and the world of power: the district is instituted
in nature through repetition, but the impossible closure of the district is marked by
the irruption of the natural into the political. “Nature” as such is not simply a meta-
phor of a universal condition. Rather it has to be taken literally as a particular
region, and the universal condition will come about as a partial metaphoric articu-
lation within this region.
Thus, the geopolitical moment can be located at the meeting point of the mood
of the region and the ideological fantasy of the political district. As we have seen,
for Bodor regional identity is based on a certain unity of mood. The mood of the
region, however, is not to be found on the level of identification. Inasmuch as
mood is beyond identification, it is also irreducible to ideology. In other words,
Bodor is trying to define mood as the objective component of a region that be-
longs to it in such a way that it is impossible to equate it with ideological fantasy or
a fully subjective determination. Just as the subject is located beyond ideological
interpellation because it is more than the mere effect of subjectivation, the region
is beyond the ideological fantasy because there is something in its objectivity that
cannot be reduced to ideology. A region has an objective identity manifested in its
mood. But as a mood, this objective content is irreducible to the field of
objectivity. Therefore, the question is: How does the subject participate in this
mood?
But let us first raise the question, what is a mood after all? Who or what can
have a mood in the first place? A subject or an object? When we speak of the mood
of a region or the mood of a novel, it appears that we automatically attribute mood
to the field of objectivity. In order for an objective entity to have a mood, the total-
ity of the object (even if it is understood to be unachieved or fragmentary) must be
presupposed. When a region has a mood, this mood is not one component among
many that make up its totality, but an attribute of the totality itself. Similarly, in
the case of an aesthetic object, if it has a mood, it does so as a totality. Its mood is
not something that could be isolated as an independent entity in itself. That is,
mood belongs to the field of objectivity in such a way that it remains irreducible to
this field. In the case of an objective reality, mood cannot be one object among the
many that make up this reality, while in the case of a novel, for example, it cannot
be one particular textual component. Even if totality is only present through its
absence, its existence can be ascertained through a mood.
Second, this posited objective totality has to assume an expressive function
that will convey its mood. Inasmuch as totality expresses something essential
about its own being, it possesses a mood. Mood therefore always expresses total-
ity. It claims that an object exists as a whole, and it does so in a particular manner.
The mood of an objective reality is never simply what this reality appears to be,
since mood is not identical with any of the objects that appear in this reality. Nor is
mood identical to what this reality wants to be perceived as, a mere appearance be-
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hind which we could identify its true being. In this sense at least, mood must be a
genuine expression of being or it is not a mood at all. But if this totality is posited,
if it only comes about as an articulation, totality is this expression and nothing
else. Mood is the only way in which this totality exists. The absent totality of the
field of objectivity will be signified by a subset of its elements, a vaguely defined
cluster of signs, which beside their particular positions in the structure will also
signify the totality of the structure. They assume an additional expressive func-
tion: besides expressing their particular identities, they also convey the mood of
the totality that they belong to. That is, while mood is irreducible to the field of ob-
jectivity, its only mode of existence is the split identity of these particular objects.
Therefore mood has no other being than what these objects allow to come about.
But what happens when a subject finds itself in a particular mood? Is there a
subjective mood at all? When we happen to be in a good or a bad mood, are we in
something or is something in us? Whatever this mood might be, we perceive it as
intimately ours. When a mood takes over, it might do so without any apparent rea-
son, but it takes over completely. One component of the soul emerges from some-
where and affects the whole of our psychic disposition. Mood saturates the totality
of our being. It claims us with full authority. So we say that we are in a mood to in-
dicate the lack of control we have over mood. As if moods were given independ-
ently of our personal existence, as if they were objective, even impersonal, cate-
gories after all. Moods are not passing whims of erratic souls, vague impressions
of melancholic minds given to capricious musings. They are not subjective cate-
gories, if by subjective we simply mean personal opinions, that everyone has the
right to feel any given way about any given subject matter. They exist in the sub-
ject in such a way that the subject experiences them as alien, as coming from
somewhere and doing something to the subject. They affect the subject, but from a
location that appears to be beyond the subject. Moods are irreducible to subjective
agency, yet they affect every element of subjectivity.
Moods exist for us as affective judgments concerning a totality that either fully
includes or affects our own lives as well. The cause of the mood appears to be ex-
ternal to the subject, as if it were inscribed in the structure of the situation, which
includes the subject, an objective totality, and the mood as well. Mood comes
about as an objective category when the subject perceives itself to be a part of a
certain objective field and passes a judgment on the way it is inscribed in the situa-
tion. Therefore, mood is the affective judgment on an objective totality as the sub-
ject appears in it. And the primary surface of appearance of a subject is always a
region, a restricted domain of objectivity that provides a familiar terrain for the
construction of identity.
This is why we could say, following Bodor, that the subject is always repre-
sented and always inhabits a region (a more or less structured situation in which
nature and history form a difficult unity). The subject is part of this region, but not
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as an object. As a subject, it is represented for this region. Something in the region,
besides representing its particular identity, also assumes the task of representing
the subject for that region. As an inhabitant of a region, the subject comes about as
the statement: I am the one for whom the totality of this region is expressed
through this given element. Mood is the coincidence of the representation of the
subject with the representation of the totality of the region. When it is in a particu-
lar mood, the subject passes judgment on its situatedness in the world, its position
within its region, in such a way that it posits the totality of the region (as repre-
sented by one of its elements) and invests this element with its own representation
as well. The judgment of mood says: such is the totality of this region; it is best
represented by these particular elements; and I relate to this totality in a particular
way; I am represented for this totality through partaking in its mood. Inasmuch as
it expresses an objective totality that the subject becomes a part of, mood is the
subject’s mode of participation in the construction of the totality of the objective
region it inhabits. Mood names the way we become parts of our regions.
We also know that works of art are capable of evoking moods. The aesthetic
experience produces moods. Mood as judgment can therefore be an aesthetic
judgment as well. The world disclosed in the work (not a realistic representation
of an empirical reality, but the world made possible through an aesthetic experi-
ence) provokes a judgment: the totality of the work comes about in this judgment,
just like the totality of the world. In this respect, it might be useful to consider a
short fragment by Adorno in which he moves beyond Hegel’s objectivist theory
of art via Benjamin’s concept of “aura.” Inasmuch as the latter is an objective de-
termination of the artwork that nevertheless designates a moment of transcen-
dence, art cannot be reduced to a fully immanent aesthetic objectivity:
Here what is called aura is known to artistic experience as the atmo-
sphere of the artwork, that whereby the nexus of the artwork’s ele-
ments points beyond this nexus and allows each individual element
to point beyond itself (274).
But, according to Adorno, the other extreme, sentimental subjectivism, is
equally mistaken since it confuses the effects of art with the properly aesthetic di-
mension of the constitution of aesthetic objectivity. Adorno’s dialectical aesthet-
ics rejects the two extremes of objectivist and subjectivist aesthetics by locating
the “aesthetic subject” within the aesthetic object as its collective component that
should not be reduced to the psychology of production or reception. The objective
meaning of an aesthetic object is that which remains irreducible in it to a subjec-
tive determination. Therefore, Adorno rejects the category of mood in the
following terms:
The concept of mood, so opposed by Hegel’s objective aesthetics, is
therefore insufficient, because it is precisely mood that reverses what
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Hegel calls the truth in the artwork into its own opposite by translat-
ing it into what is merely subjective – a spectator’s mode of reaction
– and represents it in the work itself according to the model of this
subjectivity (275).
While Adorno criticizes Hegel for his blindness to the element of mood, he
commends him for avoiding the “twilight between the aesthetic and empirical
subject.” The internal conflict of the fragment is precisely that this “twilight be-
tween the aesthetic and empirical subject” simultaneously functions as the condi-
tion of aesthetic experience and that which must be done away with if the specific-
ity of aesthetic experience is to be accounted for.
In spite of Adorno’s rejection of the category, mood could still be defined on
the basis of this fragment as that which makes art irreducible to either pure objec-
tivity or pure subjectivity. As a matter of fact, the only way to salvage the category
of mood is to relegate it to the field of objectivity (as the aural character of objec-
tivity) rather than to the subjective field as “a spectator’s mode of reaction.” In the
case of the aesthetic object, we learn from Adorno that it cannot be reduced to sub-
jective projections since it possesses an objective truth beyond all subjective de-
terminations; yet its objectivity cannot be reduced to the sum of its objective ele-
ments either, because it possesses the aural quality we could call an “objective
mood.” In the case of empirical experience, we learn that nature is the primary lo-
cale of the production of this aural effect and that therefore “the artwork is more
deeply related to nature in this element than in any other factual similarity to na-
ture” (274). Natural and aesthetic mood mirror each other since the recognition of
the former requires “recognizing in nature what it is that essentially makes an
artwork an artwork” – which is its irreducibility to subjective determinations.
Benjamin introduces the concept of aura through the definition of a necessary
distance: the subject can participate in the aura of a natural scene by establishing a
certain distance from it. The precondition of art is this distancing: the moment na-
ture is not “merely” nature anymore, the possibility of aesthetic comportment is
present in experience. This is why, while it is true that art requires a certain identi-
fication, the subjective component is not to be confused with the identification
with an empirical personality:
Just as the exemplary instance of the philistine is the reader who
judges his relation to artworks on the basis of whether he can identify
with the protagonists, so false identification with the immediately
empirical person is the index of complete obtuseness towards art
(275).
There is a necessary move beyond identification here both on the level of artis-
tic experience and the more immediate experience of subjectivity. What makes
this double move possible and necessary is precisely mood. Inasmuch as the sub-
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ject cannot be reduced to the immediate experience of empirical personality (that
is, it is capable of having a mood), there is an openness towards art, which cannot
be an identification with a realistically represented empirical reality, but rather
proceeds through the experience of that which makes it impossible to equate the
aesthetic object with its mere objectivity (that is, the mood of the object). Mood is
the way the subject, irreducible to the field of pure subjectivity, appears within the
field of objectivity as that elusive element that makes objectivity impossible.
Accordingly, mood appears in Sinistra District as that which is irreducible to
the field of historical objectivity and names the affective cathexis of the constitu-
tive failure of this objective reality. This failure, however, is not a fully transcen-
dent negativity, since it assumes a positive form through a figurative substitution.
One objective element of the region takes on the role of signifying the unity of this
region which is absent. This element, therefore, receives an excessive significa-
tion that no longer refers to an objective element of the situation itself but to its
constitutive lack. The split in the identity of this particular object is what evokes
the mood of the region. The ideological fantasy, the figure of the district as a
catachresis of impossible Eastern European identity that provides its consistency,
is revealed to be a lot less dependent on the barbed wires and strictly controlled
borders than by a repetition of the figure itself. The repetition of the figure
phenomenalizes its referent, but in such a way that it can never fully coincide with
the entity designated by the physical borders. Therefore, the catachrestic figure of
the district in the novel functions as the trope that has no other function than to sig-
nify the closure of the tropological field of the text. What on the level of represen-
tation appears as the unity of style (figured by the excessive trope of the district as
a unity), appears on the level of the represented as the unity of mood. Andrej’s
relation to the district is not expressed by the physical enclosure of the district, but
by the unity of mood.
The opening of the novel already sets the mood precisely in these terms. As
Andrej returns to the district many years after the events narrated, the whole narra-
tive is inscribed in a politics of memory. In the first and last chapters of the novel,
the constellation of three particular motifs serves the purposes of the encryption of
mood: the horrifying and unbearable squawking of wild geese, the “orange cloud
of sadness” (14), and the ski tracks left behind by Andrej himself. The bird meta-
phors of the novel are central to the construction of the whole text. In this instance,
the wild geese direct our attention to a repetition, the migratory territorialization
by an expressive function (squawking) that belongs to the domain of nature. The
territorializing effect assumes a surplus expressive function that is variously
described by Andrej in the following terms:
The frosty deaf and dumb nights of silence were filled with the
squeaking and squealing of the migrating birds. Their shrill dying
sounds – sometimes like those of the watchman’s clarinet – climbed
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down the chimney and kept stirring in the ashes of the fireplace until
the break of dawn. Their nerve-wracking whining always brought me
back to my solitude (12).
At the conclusion of the novel, the birds appear again: “I swear there is no more
unsettling word than theirs. […] Their sounds resonated even in the depths of my
bowels” (158.) The orange clouds of sadness assume a similar function, in that (as
a background to the flight of the wild geese) a particular element of nature takes
on an additional expressive function. This time, however, rather than the horror
associated with the district, the clouds remind Andrej of a metaphysical condition,
the passing of time.
The ski tracks, on the other hand, represent Andrej himself for the region. Since
it is implied by the text that these marks will never disappear, Andrej realizes that
through them, he has become an objective part of the region. The important thing
about these tracks, however, is that they serve as evidence of Andrej’s crime.
Andrej was participating in the liquidation of a group of bear-keepers supposedly
infected by the mysterious illness periodically decimating the population of the
district. Aron Wargotzki was the last member of this group hiding in the under-
ground tunnels of the reservation. Andrej, at the order of Coca Mavrodin, started
to fill up the tunnels with concrete. The ski tracks mark his itinerary as he was car-
rying the heavy sacks of cement on his back. Nevertheless, these are the marks
that represent the subject. Hence the somewhat ambiguous closure of the novel,
where the sight of the tracks evokes a feeling of “pleasant warmth” (157) and hap-
piness in Andrej because he is not going to disappear without a trace from this
region.
So, what is at stake in this figure of Eastern Europe is similar in structure to the
Orientalist fantasy invented by the West,7 only this time we have to scrutinize the
ideological fantasy created by the East itself that sustains its very reality. Eastern
Europe as a mood, however, is not a “merely fictional” Eastern Europe, but a
“real” Eastern Europe that has no other existence than the interruption of both the
geographical and the political fantasy of regional identity. In Bodor’s case, as the
properly geopolitical agency (which means that it is neither geographical nor po-
litical in the restricted sense), mood is an attempt to establish an affective commu-
nity beyond ethnic, cultural, and other differences. Participating in the mood of a
region means recovering an “objective” point of reference beyond ideological or
mere subjective determinations which nevertheless remains irreducible to the
field of objectivity. Its elusive nature, its very precariousness, and its openness to
numerous types of manipulation, however, do not detract anything from its real-
ity. And neither does the fact that region, mood, subject, and totality simply do not
preexist the actual articulation of their configurations. As the regional, “ontol-
ogized” condition of political experience inscribed into the sanctity of un-
representable personal experience, which makes political identity “impossible”
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(not non-existent, but rather always threatened), the mood of a region shows that
the “universal” condition in its abstract emptiness does not exist without regional
contamination. A community is never without history, which is its repetitious at-
tempt to inhabit different kinds of regions. The ontological limit is given a particu-
lar “local flavor,” a recognizable mood, since it exists only as the internal limit of
particular systems of symbolization but never completely independent of them.
The repetitious emergence of this limit creates the history of a region.
Notes
1 See, for example, Angyalosi, Bán, and Kardos.
2 See Ács, Bán, Béla Bodor, Angyalosi, and Márton.
3 See, Simon, Szirák, Kovács, Bengi.
4 For different formulations of the role of recognition see: Reményi (“the duplicity of the never-
experienced and that which exists in memory” [93]); and Pozsvai (56).
5 Andrej describes this love after reading Béla’s diary in the following way: “He wrote that it
was impossible to have enough of her. Whenever he looked at her, he had the feeling that even
between her toes there are tiny little hungry pussies hiding. The best thing would have been to
drink the whole woman up like a glass of water. A love like this, of course, was already se-
cretly nearing its end.” (97) We can also see here that excess is more than just an external trait;
it is a cause that defines the outcome and destiny of the narrative.
6 Furthermore, the very concept of character seems to have been invaded by this excessive logic.
For example, Mustafa Mukkerman, the only true outsider in the district, who in contrast with
the other characters emanates an excess of humanity, is described as a 600-kilogram giant,
whose undulating bodily excesses and flaccid folds of flesh mesmerize the border guards as he
appears totally naked in the middle of a snowstorm during a strip search. Connie Illafeld, Béla
Bundasian’s true love, after abusive psychiatric treatment in Colonia Sinistra, is reduced to an
unrecognizable hairy monster who speaks an incomprehensible mixture of languages – and the
suggestion is entertained that she might even have grown a penis. As the narrator comments,
she moves from being a fairy to an animal: that is, she moves from an excess to an absolute
lack of humanity, but the properly human status is constantly denied to her (101). Béla
Bundasian, in turn, becomes a surplus element when his very existence becomes excessive af-
ter his official file is destroyed and, receiving no recognition from the system, he ends up com-
mitting suicide. Furthermore, at a certain point Colonel Coca Mavrodin dies frozen in a block
of ice, but when spring comes and the ice melts, only her clothes remain behind, revealing her
to be some sort of substanceless entity. The novel also presents more direct interventions into
the concept of character through the technique of reduplication. The two Hamza Petrikas, for
example, are described in the following way: “They were albino twins and so similar to each
other that their thick bear-keeper overalls creased in the exact same spots. As the path of the
mist released from their nostrils indicated, they even breathed to the same rhythm. And on top
of all that, according to the little tin plates hanging around their necks, they were both called
Hamza Petrika.” (80) A similar reduplication happens with the heroic bear-keeper, Géza
Kökény, who becomes almost indistinguishable from his statue.
7 See, for example, Larry Wolff’s book on Eastern Europe, where he argues that “It was Western
Europe that invented Eastern Europe as its complementary other half in the eighteenth century,
the age of Enlightenment. It was also the Enlightenment, with its intellectual centers in West-
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ern Europe, that cultivated and appropriated to itself the new notion of ‘civilization,’ an eigh-
teenth-century neologism, and civilization discovered its complement, within the same conti-
nent, in shadowed lands of backwardness, even barbarism. Such was the invention of Eastern
Europe” (4). Furthermore, he explains “the construction of Eastern Europe as a paradox of si-
multaneous inclusion and exclusion, Europe but not Europe. Eastern Europe defined Western
Europe by contrast, as the Orient defined the Occident, but was also made to mediate between
Europe and the Orient. One might describe the invention of Eastern Europe as an intellectual
project of demi-Orientalization” (7).
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